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Monday, November 14, 2005

OK I've had enough. For two reasons. First, reviewing Hitchens' increasingly rebarbative and incoherent posts was starting to do my head in. After all, all he does is write the same article over and over again. My own rejoinders would eventually have reached a similar level of tedium.

The last straw was when I found out that Hitchens gave an (apparently paid) speech at the Family Research Council (google it). So much for the greatest living atheist. The man is beyond parody (and, increasingly, beyond psychiatric help).

Secondly there is now a new blog which I am happy to hand over to: http://christopherhitchenswatch.blogspot.com/ . This will cover the same ground as this one.

As for me, I will probably be starting a new blog (or two) in the new year (if so, I will announce them here), and there is also 'Project X', which may or may not happen with the help of Max Sawicky. My book is also due to be published in March 2006, and there will be publicising to do.....onwards and downwards......
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Sunday, August 28, 2005

Yes yes I know. But I have been busy, honest! Writing a book etc. etc. etc. However that will be finished by the end of this week (or at least that's what my publisher thinks....) then I have to go on holiday. So how about we say Hitchenswatch will be back online at the beginning of October 2005?
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Friday, September 24, 2004

This is a fascinating article. It shows, that as some people have discerned, there are not two but three strands to the current Bush administration. First, there are the extremist right-wing Christians. Second, there are the most brutal and thuggist extremists of the paleo-Conservatists: Cheney and Rumsfeld (these men are the heirs to Kissingerean realpolitik, though they are considerably more vicious even than him). And finally, there are the neo-conservatives.

Hitchens grasps the distinction.

'There are two strands of conservatism on the US right that Hitch has always opposed. The first was the Barry Goldwater-Pat Buchanan isolationist right. They argued for "America First" - disengagement from the world, and the abandonment of Europe to fascism. The second was the Henry Kissinger right, which argued for the installation of pro-American, pro-business regimes, even if it meant liquidating democracies (as in Chile or Iran) and supporting and equipping practitioners of genocide.

He believes neoconservatism is a distinctively new strain of thought, preached by ex-leftists, who believed in using US power to spread democracy. "It's explicitly anti-Kissingerian. Kissinger hates this stuff. He opposed intervening in the Balkans. Kissinger Associates were dead against [the war in] Iraq. He can't understand the idea of backing democracy - it's totally alien to him."'

And it makes clear that Hitchens is a neo-conservative, perhaps the purest of the breed currently writing.

What Hitchens has failed to grasp is that all the branches of the Bush administration (and even Buchanan) have one major thing in common, which is this:

A belief that America can and should do whatever it wants in the foreign arena. Even Buchanan and the 'isolationists' believe this: it's just that they think that what should be done is normally 'nothing'. But make no mistake their isolationism isn't based on bleeding heart liberalism. It's just that their attitude to the rest of the world is 'fuck 'em'.

Moreover there are strong links between the Christian Right and neo-conservatism. Without going into details, it is now very clear that Marxism (like the Hegelianism which it developed from) was not fundamentally about ethics but about meaning. In other words, it was an attempt to deal with the 'crisis of European nihilism' and plug the intellectual hole left by 'rationalist' criticism of the Bible and early 19th century scepticism. Simpler still: Marxism was a secular religion and was always intended to be such. Those who adopted Marxism as a religious substitute were not betraying the spirit of Marxism: on the contrary it was those who thought that Marxism was a kind of science who were doing this.

And in many ways it was very similar to Christianity. As Nietzsche pointed out 'socialist' or 'Marxist' morality is almost indistinguishable from Christian morality. Both belief in the 'last days', a day of judgement (revolution in Marxism) when the righteous would be revenged. Both also believe in an 'End of Time/History' when the Golden Age would begin (to Marxists on Earth, to Christians in Heaven).

Moreover, both also believe that History is a riddle, and that they possess the solution. In other words, there is one 'socio-political' or 'metaphysical' truth and they have it. Moreover, this is deduced a priori from certain assumptions, and acceptance of these truths is defined as the test of rationality. In other words: if you don't believe what I believe you are by definition, not rational. And, therefore, since rationality is the key to being human, you have a lower order of humanity than I have. And, therefore, I can do what I want with you.

Now this link between Hegel and neo-conservativism has been made explicit by Fukayama. But in any case, it makes clear how apparently secular thinkers can make common cause with Christian conservatives. To put it bluntly: because once you accept that Marxism IS a religion, there wasn't that much distance to go.

Therefore, you now start to understand the paradox: how can someone who is continually proclaiming their 'rationality' ignore empirical evidence, shout down opponents instead of arguing with them and so on? Because he (i.e. Hitchens in this case) possesses the truth about History, and you don't. Therefore, what's the point arguing with you? The truth is there: if you don't choose to see it, it must point to a moral or intellectual defect in you.

To come round full circle. The neo-conservatives (who are best seen as being 'right' Hegelians) accept a current state as being the end of history. In Hegel's case it was the current Prussian state. In the neocons case it is the current US. Therefore, since History leads to the US, and since a warrior elite of philosophers/intellectuals know this truth, therefore it would be immoral of them not to fight for it. And if this means invading other countries and imposing US style democracy on them so be it.

Again this shows their other intellectual antecedents: the extremist Jacobins and Lenin. Once one knows that there is one Utopia, and you know how to create it, then clearly this is the ultimate End and any and all Means can be used to justify it. Hence the rather strange juxtaposition of constant moralising and astonishing, almost surreal acts of violence. This links Lenin, the French revolutionaries, and the neo-cons.
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Sunday, August 29, 2004

I loathed Hitchen's review of Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 but this article from Media Lens makes the case better than i could. From Media Lens bulletin Board.


Christopher Hitchens vs. Michael Moore

I have stitched together this response to Christopher Hitchens' review of Michael Moore's latest movie, Fahrenheit 9/11. Material has been cribbed from Chris Parry, Jameson Simmons, Mark Jensen, Ollie Byrd, Kevin Wohlmut, Slate's own discussion forum, Usenet, and a few other places I failed to bookmark. See subsequent post for links to original sources.



Here we go...

Unfairenheit 9/11
The lies of Michael Moore.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, June 21, 2004, at 12:26 PM PT

KW: I have to address the overarching philosophical and logical framework here: Hitchens is criticizing the movie almost completely based on what it does not contain. The movie is "opportunistic" ... because of things which Hitchens says Moore and the Left would be saying in some parallel universe where events unfolded differently. At a casual glance, Hitchens' lengthy review seems to focus maybe fifty percent on what Moore actually does say, with the other half — the what-if scenarios, Moore's remarks at the Telluride film festival, Al Franken, Gore Vidal — leaving the bounds of the celluloid entirely. ... Worse still, Hitchens takes the absence of this or that statement from the film, and twists it into a proactive statement of its opposite, which he then attacks.

One of the many problems with the American left, and indeed of the American left, has been its image and self-image as something rather too solemn, mirthless, herbivorous, dull, monochrome, righteous, and boring. How many times, in my old days at The Nation magazine, did I hear wistful and semienvious ruminations? Where was the radical Firing Line show? Who will be our Rush Limbaugh? I used privately to hope that the emphasis, if the comrades ever got around to it, would be on the first of those and not the second. But the meetings themselves were so mind-numbing and lugubrious that I thought the danger of success on either front was infinitely slight.

Nonetheless, it seems that an answer to this long-felt need is finally beginning to emerge. I exempt Al Franken's unintentionally funny Air America network, to which I gave a couple of interviews in its early days. There, one could hear the reassuring noise of collapsing scenery and tripped-over wires and be reminded once again that correct politics and smooth media presentation are not even distant cousins. With Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11, however, an entirely new note has been struck. Here we glimpse a possible fusion between the turgid routines of MoveOn.org and the filmic standards, if not exactly the filmic skills, of Sergei Eisenstein or Leni Riefenstahl.

To describe this film as dishonest and demagogic would almost be to promote those terms to the level of respectability. To describe this film as a piece of crap would be to run the risk of a discourse that would never again rise above the excremental. To describe it as an exercise in facile crowd-pleasing would be too obvious. Fahrenheit 9/11 is a sinister exercise in moral frivolity, crudely disguised as an exercise in seriousness. It is also a spectacle of abject political cowardice masking itself as a demonstration of "dissenting" bravery.

J9: [Hitchens] begins by talking about how he's not going to describe the film — dishonest, demagogic, a piece of crap, an exercise in facile crowd-pleasing — thereby associating all of those words in the reader's mind with the film. He gets to call it a piece of crap without calling it a piece of crap... [I just] thought I'd recognize his cleverness, since he went to all the trouble of trying to be clever.

In late 2002, almost a year after the al-Qaida assault on American society, I had an onstage debate with Michael Moore at the Telluride Film Festival. In the course of this exchange, he stated his view that Osama Bin Laden should be considered innocent until proven guilty. This was, he said, the American way. The intervention in Afghanistan, he maintained, had been at least to that extent unjustified. Something—I cannot guess what, since we knew as much then as we do now— has since apparently persuaded Moore that Osama Bin Laden is as guilty as hell. Indeed, Osama is suddenly so guilty and so all-powerful that any other discussion of any other topic is a dangerous "distraction" from the fight against him.

SH: The source of pure venom in the article — indeed, of [Hitchens'] media blitz against Moore since 2002 — seems to stem from a confrontation in late 2002 at the Telluride Film Festival. Hitchens refers to the clash at every chance, his "smoking gun" of Moore's hypocrisy. From his account, Moore continually went after easy applause, shouting "mission not accomplished" when discussing Osama bin Laden's getaway and playing the "real American" card by insisting he was "innocent until proven guilty." Hitchens was so bold as to bring a tape of this debate with him to Joe Scarborough's MSNBC program "Scarborough Country" on June 30, and a transcript of the exchange follows:
Scarborough: You brought a tape of yourself debating Michael Moore in September 2002 at the Telluride Film Festival. And here's what he said about Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Let‘s take a listen.

(Begin video clip)

Moore: It seems as if he and his group were the ones who did this, then they should be tracked down, captured, and brought to justice.

Hitchens: Do you mind if I break in and say...

Moore: Yes.

Hitchens: Ask you, what is the "if" doing in that last sentence?

...

Moore: Well, all people are innocent until proven guilty in this country.

Hitchens: So you have no...

(applause, crosstalk)

Moore: Even the worst piece of scum.

Hitchens: I feel I have to press you on that. You regard it as an open question, the responsibility of Osama bin Laden?

Moore: Until anyone is convicted of any crime, no matter how horrific the crime, they are innocent until proven guilty. And as Americans...

(crosstalk)

Hitchens: No, that's all I asked you.

Moore: Never leave that position.

Hitchens: I'm sorry. So bin Laden's claims of responsibility strike you as the ravings of a clowns, say?

(laughter)

Hitchens: OK. Fine.

(End video clip)

...

Hitchens: That's why I looked to see if I still had the tape, because I thought, now, a guy who was 100 percent opposed to the war in Afghanistan at the time — that's Michael Moore — he thought it was a war for oil, a war for pipelines, an unjust war — why is he suddenly saying he is against the Iraq war because it's the distraction from the hunt for Osama bin Laden? You follow my point here?

Scarborough: Of course.

Hitchens: Why does someone who thought that Osama was innocent and Afghanistan was no problem suddenly switch in this way? Because unless he says that he was dead wrong all along and Osama bin Laden was innocent and wronged, he can't say that everything else is a distraction from the hunt for Osama. So it's bait and switch. It's the work of a moral cretin and a political idiot.
Hitchens actually performs some Clintonian semantic gymnastics here. Moore's "if" is not intending "I think Osama is innocent and the Afghan war is unjustified;" he's trying to make an argument for American due process: "If he and his group were the ones who did this, then they should be tracked down, captured and brought to justice." Admittedly, Moore's choice of words is very awkward and possibly inappropriate given the topic, but notice the ease by which Hitchens extrapolates this verbal misstep into personal insults. In a recent interview on CNN, Moore makes his point much more clearly:
Because if you have a suspect and the suspect gets away, the police — or our military — have a right to go after and get that suspect. In fact, they should go get the suspect. And Richard Clarke's point, and my point is, is that they make a half-hearted effort. They kept our Special Forces from going in the part of Afghanistan where bin Laden was. They kept the Special Forces out of there for two months. They only sent 11,000 troops. As Richard Clarke said, there's more police here in Manhattan than the number of soldiers we sent in to get Osama bin Laden. So for all their talk about wanting to get bin Laden, they made a half-hearted attempt to do it, because they didn't want to divert resources from what their main goal was, which was to go in and invade Iraq.
I believe that I understand the convenience of this late conversion.

SB: There has been no such conversion, Hitchens is making it up. He is setting up and attacking a straw man argument (the first of many).

Contrary to what Hitchens would have us believe, Moore does not consider Osama bin-Laden to be an "all-powerful" criminal mastermind (secure in his hideout, controlling a global network, consisting of thousands of well-trained and motivated men). His previous work makes this clear, and I saw nothing in Fahrenheit 9/11 that indicates Moore has changed his mind on that particular point.

Fahrenheit 9/11 makes the following points about Bin Laden and about Afghanistan, and makes them in this order:

1) The Bin Laden family (if not exactly Osama himself) had a close if convoluted business relationship with the Bush family, through the Carlyle Group.

2) Saudi capital in general is a very large element of foreign investment in the United States.

3) The Unocal company in Texas had been willing to discuss a gas pipeline across Afghanistan with the Taliban, as had other vested interests.

4) The Bush administration sent far too few ground troops to Afghanistan and thus allowed far too many Taliban and al-Qaida members to escape.

5) The Afghan government, in supporting the coalition in Iraq, was purely risible in that its non-army was purely American.

6) The American lives lost in Afghanistan have been wasted. (This I divine from the fact that this supposedly "antiwar" film is dedicated ruefully to all those killed there, as well as in Iraq.)

It must be evident to anyone, despite the rapid-fire way in which Moore's direction eases the audience hastily past the contradictions, that these discrepant scatter shots do not cohere at any point.

J9: [Hitchens'] statement that "Moore's direction eases the audience hastily past the contradictions" eases the reader past the fact that the assertion of contradictions is unsupported. There's no contradiction between the Bin Ladens' relationship with Bush through the Carlyle Group and any other point. There's no contradiction between the role of Saudi capital in the U.S. and any other point. There's no contradiction between the criticism of troop strength and any other point. There's no contradiction between the legitimacy and viability of the Afghan government and any other point.

SH: Hitchens [falsely] notes the "rapid-fire way in which Moore's direction eases the audience hastily past the contradictions," and then launches into his own rapid-fire volley of either/or fallacies...

Either the Saudis run U.S. policy (through family ties or overwhelming economic interest), or they do not.

SB: This kind of either/or dissection is unsound and unwarranted because, instead of running U.S. policy, Moore contends that the Saudi relationship has, at various times and to various degrees, influenced U.S. policy, and that the current administration jeopardised U.S. security by placating Bush family cronies in Saudi Arabia.

MH: This is a dramatic oversimplification on Hitchens' part and one that vastly exceeds the reductionism of which he accuses Moore. To argue that a particular group has an influence on US policy is vastly different from saying that they run it outright. And demonstrating that politicians tend to respond to people and organizations that put money in their pockets — which is what Moore did with the Saudis in his film — is not some wacky conspiracy theory, it's an attempt at institutional analysis.

I-: How can this false set of alternatives, with their illogical black hole of an excluded middle, ground a criticism of Fahrenheit 9/11? It is Hitchens who is reductive here, not Moore. Moore cinematically makes a collaborative connection between the Bushes and the Saudis, as has been documented by serious students of the subject ... raising good questions about Saudi influence on American policy, and pointing to the circle of big money chasing big government chasing big money, positing the Bushes running around the circle. The appropriate colour is Moore's gray, not Hitchens' black and white of the quoted false proposition.

As allies and patrons of the Taliban regime, they either opposed Bush's removal of it, or they did not. (They opposed the removal, all right: They wouldn't even let Tony Blair land his own plane on their soil at the time of the operation.)

MH: I would have hoped that someone as smart as Christopher Hitchens would have had a better understanding of the nuances of international politics than is demonstrated in this sentence. Again he engages in simplistic binarisms that fail to reflect the way that influence is exerted in the world.

Sure, the Saudis might have opposed the removal of the Taliban. I concede that point, mainly because I don't have any evidence to the contrary on hand, and because it's not really the key here. But in every situation like this, the players involved have to make judgments based on very complex sets of circumstances. And in this case, the Saudis might well have realized that the US was going into Afghanistan with or without [their approval, and decided, at a particularly sensitive time, it was more important not to upset their allies in the region and its own citizens in the Saudi Kingdom, and not to be seen assisting American efforts or bowing to western demands].

The Saudis can oppose the coalition while still supporting US policy more generally in order to maintain good relations with the world's only superpower. And the US can accept that there are some deals the Saudis are not willing to make, as long as they play ball in the long term. No contradiction here at all.

I-: Hitchens' flawed thesis here is that there can be no notion of influence. If someone isn't moving lockstep with either Saudi or American demands, Moore's "theory" is undone. Moore here is more subtle and nuanced than is Hitchens.

Either we sent too many troops, or were wrong to send any at all—the latter was Moore's view as late as 2002—or we sent too few.

SB: Though himself immediately opposed to military action, Moore is simply noting that, if the Bush White House really was so determined to send troops into Afghanistan to apprehend Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts, then the president should have seen to it that enough soldiers were deployed to fulfill that aim. Countless experts have made a compelling case that the Bush administration blatantly undermined the military effort in Afghanistan through its eagerness to attack Iraq: the operation was mounted without the requisite troop strength, that multilingual special forces were considered so precious and, um, special, they were not able to act decisively, and were then pulled out and packed off elsewhere before their job was finished. It is not contradictory nor dishonest of Michael Moore to further publicise such a widely held view, or to express his dissatisfaction that not enough is being done help Afghanis, however sarcastically.

JP: There's nothing inconsistent — or "sinister" or cowardly (to use Hitchens' terms) — about saying we shouldn't invade Afghanistan one day, and then, having invaded anyway, over Moore's objections apparently, for him then to criticize how the invasion was prosecuted. Moore's stance covering both Telluride and Fahrenheit 9/11 might aptly be summarized as, "I don't think you should invade, but if you do, don't screw around." Reasonable enough.

MH: The contradiction that Hitchens claims to be presenting here is no contradiction at all. It is perfectly reasonable to oppose a particular military action and then, when you find out that the action is going ahead, to argue that if it's going to be done at all, then at least it should be done properly.

If we were going to make sure no Taliban or al-Qaida forces survived or escaped, we would have had to be more ruthless than I suspect that Mr. Moore is really recommending. And these are simply observations on what is "in" the film.

JS: Hitchens clings to that most desperate trick of debaters with no ground to stand on — the straw man argument. He continually posits that Moore is angry with Bush for being light on the Taliban, the Saudis, and Bin Laden — using that assertion to say that Moore is both pro-war and anti-war. In reality, Moore is simply exposing the contradictions in Bush's movements. Bush makes terror the number one priority, whips up fear using the Al Qaeda bogeyman, but then dodges Iraqward when it comes time to really do anything about it.

If we turn to the facts that are deliberately left out, we discover that there is an emerging Afghan army, that the country is now a joint NATO responsibility and thus under the protection of the broadest military alliance in history, that it has a new constitution and is preparing against hellish odds to hold a general election, and that at least a million and a half of its former refugees have opted to return. I don't think a pipeline is being constructed yet, not that Afghanistan couldn't do with a pipeline. But a highway from Kabul to Kandahar—an insurance against warlordism and a condition of nation-building—is nearing completion with infinite labor and risk. We also discover that the parties of the Afghan secular left—like the parties of the Iraqi secular left—are strongly in favor of the regime change.

Z-: Hitchens criticizes Moore for what was left out of the film about how well Afghanistan is doing and then he is guilty himself of failing to mention [the torture of prisoners there, the swift resurgence of the Taliban, the multiple crimes of the United States in its continuing operations] and that Afghanistan has its second largest poppy crop in history. (Bad news for drug wars.) Does that make Hitchens a liar? (No, no more than Moore's failure to address Afghanistan's progress makes him one.)

MH: More silliness. While Moore may not have included all of this stuff, those facts do not really undermine his case. Sure, Afghanistan might have an "emerging" army and be part of NATO's responsibility. But does Hitchens, or anyone else for that matter, really believe that it's not the Americans who still call the shots with respect to Afghanistan's military?

Hitchens might also be right that the secular left in Afghanistan and Iraq supported the overthrow of their respective regimes. The secular left in Afghanistan wanted to overthrow the Taliban well before the United States took any interest in doing so. In fact, the secular left in Afghanistan was trying to work out ways of throwing out the Taliban at the same time that Taliban leaders were making friendly visits to Texas during GWB's governorship. But Hitchens, again going for the "[you're either] with us or against us" model of argumentation, implies that the secular left's opposition to the Taliban and to Saddam Hussein also suggests that the secular left was happy with the way that the US-led forces undertook to overthrow and replace those regimes. Again, he fails to appreciate that there are people who opposed the Taliban and Saddam, but who also opposed the methods used by the US to remove them. This is also true, by the way, of secular leftists elsewhere throughout the world. I'm a secular leftist myself, and I was strongly opposed to both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein well before 9/11. Doesn't mean I agree with the methods used by the United States to remove them, nor does it mean that I support the way that the US and its allies and proxies have run those countries since then.

SB: Elsewhere, Hitchens mocks the idea that the intervention in Afghanistan was anything other than punishment for state terrorism and a rescue operation for an enslaved society. According to Hitchens, Moore's suggestion that there may have been another motivation for the intervention (i.e. the development of enormous, long coveted energy resources within the region) collapses upon discovery that Unocal's negotiations with the Taliban were abandoned in late 1998, and not resumed. He also claims that a "long, boring and convoluted" section of Fahrenheit 9/11 is devoted to this theory.

In fact Moore spends approximately 140 seconds visiting this topic. Moore is partly correct: According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Unocal signed a memorandum of understanding with the Taliban to build a pipeline in August 1996, they then signed another agreement in January 1998.


In 1997, US state department officials and executives of the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) discreetly entertained Taliban leaders in Washington and Houston, Texas. They were entertained lavishly, with dinner parties at luxurious homes in Houston. They asked to be taken shopping at a Walmart and flown to tourist attractions, including the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida and Mount Rushmore in South Dakota, where they gazed upon the faces of American presidents chiselled in the rockface. The Wall Street Journal, bulletin of US power, effused, "The Taliban are the players most capable of achieving peace in Afghanistan at this moment in history." (John Pilger, "The Betrayal of Afghanistan", The Guardian, September 20, 2003)
What Moore does not add is that Unocal suspended its role in August 1998 and then withdrew in December 1998, citing "low oil prices and turmoil in Afghanistan as making the pipeline project uneconomical and too risky". That said — and this is an important point — the basic, underlying plan was never completely discarded; rather, it was put on hold pending a softening of attitudes (evidenced by video footage of a Taliban emissary visiting the U.S. in March 2001) or until an internationally recognised Afghanistan government was in place (regime change, anyone?). To at least one extent the outcome of the talks is unimportant — the fact people were permitted and prepared to do business with the Taliban suffices to demonstrate that the intervention was not for humanitarian purposes.

Three days after the 9/11 attacks, Unocal issued a press statement so as to put some distance between themselves and the Taliban without precluding their own interest in a future post-Taliban era proposal. It reads,


Beginning in late 1997, Unocal was a member of a multinational consortium that was evaluating construction of a Central Asia Gas (CentGas) pipeline between Turkmenistan and Pakistan. Part of this pipeline would have crossed western Afghanistan. However, Unocal suspended its participation in the CentGas consortium in August 1998 and formally withdrew from that consortium in December 1998. Our company has had no further role in developing or funding that project or any other project that might involve the Taliban.
In 2002, after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan's minister for Mines and Industries, Mohammad Alim Razim, informed Reuters that Unocal Corp was the "lead company" among those that would build a new pipeline. But in May of the same year, Unocal Chairman Charles Williamson told stockholders that "Unocal has no plans or interest in becoming involved in any projects in Afghanistan". A short time later one such project was formally given the go-ahead (details yet to be finalised).

In light of their previous involvement and investment, I personally find Williamson's claim [of having no interest] totally unconvincing. There has been a great deal of speculation regarding this pipeline and Unocal had received a lot of negative publicity as a result. More realistically, any renewed interest they may have had was probably weighed and measured against that bad press and the likelihood of more to come.


Even in considering the weaknesses of the film, which are also real and significant, one has to place them in a certain context. If Fahrenheit 9/11, for example, attempts to cover too much ground, if it touches on too many issues and not any one of them in sufficient depth, can one blame Moore entirely? After all, if the US media, with all its vast resources and technology, were treating events with a modicum of honesty, would there be such a gaping hole that Moore clearly feels he has to fill up single-handedly? Would he feel the need to cover everything, if the official news media had been investigating and exposing anything? (David Walsh, "Michael Moore's Contribution", World Socialist Web Site, June 30, 2004)
But this is not the sort of irony in which Moore chooses to deal. He prefers leaden sarcasm to irony and, indeed, may not appreciate the distinction. In a long and paranoid (and tedious) section at the opening of the film, he makes heavy innuendoes about the flights that took members of the Bin Laden family out of the country after Sept. 11. I banged on about this myself at the time and wrote a Nation column drawing attention to the groveling Larry King interview with the insufferable Prince Bandar, which Moore excerpts. However, recent developments have not been kind to our Mike. In the interval between Moore's triumph at Cannes and the release of the film in the United States, the 9/11 commission has found nothing to complain of in the timing or arrangement of the flights. And Richard Clarke, Bush's former chief of counterterrorism, has come forward to say that he, and he alone, took the responsibility for authorizing those Saudi departures.

CP: Okay, so Hitchens calls Moore tedious and paranoid for pointing out something that Hitchens himself admits to having pointed out? Double standards anyone?

DP: This is what the 9/11 Commission's staff report 10 actually says:


The Saudi Flights

National air space was closed on September 11. Fearing reprisals against Saudi nationals, the Saudi government asked for help in getting some of its citizens out of the country. We have not yet identified who they contacted for help. But we have found that the request came to the attention of Richard Clarke and that each of the flights we have studied was investigated by the FBI and dealt with in a professional manner prior to its departure.
For the moment lets put aside the question of who approved the flights. One of the basic questions concerning the Saudi flights is who exactly did the Saudi's contact to request the flights? So far the 9/11 commission says it doesn't know.

LT: Moore claims that the White House approved the escape of the bin Ladens. Hitchens cites an article in which Richard Clarke, who had earlier indicated that the White House and the State Department were involved in the decision to allow the bin Ladens to leave America, now takes "full responsibility":


"It didn’t get any higher than me," he said. "On 9-11, 9-12 and 9-13, many things didn’t get any higher than me. I decided it in consultation with the FBI."
If this were even remotely credible, Moore would still not be responsible. After all, it is Richard Clarke's own testimony (on two separate occasions) that either the State Department or the White House or both came up with the idea or approved the idea of sending the bin Ladens home, with the compliments of the US government. Here are both of the quotations cited by Moore...


It is true that members of the Bin Laden family were among those who left. We knew that at the time. I can't say much more in open session, but it was a conscious decision with complete review at the highest levels of the State Department and the FBI and the White House. (Testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Former Counterterrorism Chief, National Security Council, before The Senate Judiciary Committee, September 3, 2003)

I was making or coordinating a lot of decisions on 9/11 and the days immediately after. And I would love to be able to tell you who did it, who brought this proposal to me, but I don't know. Since you pressed me, the two possibilities that are most likely are either the Department of State, or the White House Chief of Staff's Office. But I don't know. (Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 24, 2004)
And here is Clarke's testimony from the same article Hitchens adduces:


"The request came to me, and I refused to approve it," Clarke testified. "I suggested that it be routed to the FBI and that the FBI look at the names of the individuals who were going to be on the passenger manifest and that they approve it or not. I spoke with the — at the time — No. 2 person in the FBI, Dale Watson, and asked him to deal with this issue. The FBI then approved … the flight."
In the new version of the story, the FBI approved the flight. But in the same article, the FBI denies having approved the flight. So, when Hitchens says that "recent developments have not been kind to our Mike" (apparently without irony, since in the immediately preceding sentence he has admitted to having voiced the same concerns himself), he might as well say that recent developments have been unkind to the facts.

This might not matter so much to the ethos of Fahrenheit 9/11, except that—as you might expect—Clarke is presented throughout as the brow-furrowed ethical hero of the entire post-9/11 moment.

SB: Demonstrably false. Clarke's appearance is minimal. People only need watch the film for themselves to see how wrong Hitchens is.

And it does not seem very likely that, in his open admission about the Bin Laden family evacuation, Clarke is taking a fall, or a spear in the chest, for the Bush administration. So, that's another bust for this windy and bloated cinematic "key to all mythologies."

MH: Here we have Hitchens ... assuming that if you agree with one position that a person takes, then you must agree with all positions. There is no necessary contradiction if Richard Clarke believes that getting the Saudis out was the right thing to do, but also believes that the Bush administration has f-cked up other national security and intelligence issues.

Also, while the 9/11 Commission might have concluded that there was nothing wring with the "timing or arrangement of the flights," why should this preclude others from believing that the Bin Laden [family] should, at the very least, have been [thoroughly] questioned as to what they might have known about the attacks. It's a little strange that so many conservatives have been willing to give the US government a pass on its awful treatment of prisoners taken during the "war on terror", and have even been happy to support such treatment when meted out to American citizens (Hamdi and Padilla), and yet are incredulous that some people think we should have questioned the direct relatives of the man responsible for 9/11.

I'm not saying, and neither was Moore saying, that the Bin Laden family members should have been dragged off to Guantanamo or shoved into holding cells somewhere. I just find it troubling that the only people allowed to fly in those early days, and the only Arabs the US government seemed overly concerned about protecting, were the same ones who were related to the world's most wanted terrorist, and who also had massive investments in the United States.

A film that bases itself on a big lie and a big misrepresentation can only sustain itself by a dizzying succession of smaller falsehoods, beefed up by wilder and (if possible) yet more-contradictory claims.

F9: Once more Hitchens eases the reader past the meat and heads straight for the dessert, which would make sense if his point about Moore's points not cohering was valid. Except it's not. Put another way, Hitchens makes the understandable but misguided assumption that he has established sound arguments for the "big lie" and "big misrepresentation" of which he speaks, but he has not.

President Bush is accused of taking too many lazy vacations. (What is that about, by the way? Isn't he supposed to be an unceasing planner for future aggressive wars?) But the shot of him "relaxing at Camp David" shows him side by side with Tony Blair. I say "shows," even though this photograph is on-screen so briefly that if you sneeze or blink, you won't recognize the other figure. A meeting with the prime minister of the United Kingdom, or at least with this prime minister, is not a goof-off.

OB: [Hitchens says], and I guess I am supposed to think that Moore says, "Isn’t he [Bush] supposed to be an unceasing planner for future aggressive wars." [Hitchens makes] this up. It isn't in the movie. And next, Since Moore says [Bush] is lazy, he is supposed to have contradicted himself for contradicting what [Hitchens] imagine he believes. Again, [Hitchens has] succeeded in criticizing something [he] brought into the conversation, [his] assumption about what Moore believes.

JS: You can tell that Hitchens is grasping at straws because he tries to pick apart Moore's assertion that Bush spends too much time on vacation by attacking the photographs Moore puts in the film. ... Hitchens says "the photograph is on the screen so briefly that if you sneeze or blink, you won't recognize the other figure." Well, I recognized him. Don't you think if the picture were really so damaging to Moore's argument, he would have just left it out of his own film? I'm pretty sure Moore gets final cut. There are plenty – plenty – of other pictures of Bush on vacation.

MH: In case anyone failed to notice, even if we put aside all the terrorism and foreign policy issues, at the time that Moore is talking about the nation's economy was also going to hell in a hand basket. I do agree with Hitchens that the President does not have to be in Washington in order to be working. I also agree that it is possible for Bush to perform many of his duties while on his ranch in Crawford. And I think that Moore probably made too much of Bush's golfing and other vacation activities. But Hitchens conveniently ignores the totality of these vacation images, and what they may (or may not) say about Bush's level of commitment, and chooses instead to comment on an image of Bush at Camp David, ignoring all the silly photo-ops like serving grits in a restaurant or playing golf or cutting wood or skeet-shooting that Bush seems to love so much.

The president is also captured in a well-worn TV news clip, on a golf course, making a boilerplate response to a question on terrorism and then asking the reporters to watch his drive. Well, that's what you get if you catch the president on a golf course. If Eisenhower had done this, as he often did, it would have been presented as calm statesmanship. If Clinton had done it, as he often did, it would have shown his charm.

More interesting is the moment where Bush is shown frozen on his chair at the infant school in Florida, looking stunned and useless for seven whole minutes after the news of the second plane on 9/11. Many are those who say that he should have leaped from his stool, adopted a Russell Crowe stance, and gone to work. I could even wish that myself. But if he had done any such thing then (as he did with his "Let's roll" and "dead or alive" remarks a month later), half the Michael Moore community would now be calling him a man who went to war on a hectic, crazed impulse.

JL: This is a bogus argument — it assumes that there is no other response [Bush] might have made. What [Hitchens describes] would not have been decisive, effective leadership, any more so than his seven minutes staring into space. I believe an effective leader would have excused himself from the class immediately, gracefully, and headed off to take charge.

J9: I see no evidence, in Moore or anywhere else, that most people think Bush "...should have leaped from his stool, adopted a Russell Crowe stance, and gone to work." Much more common is the reaction that he simply should have done something besides sit there. Something like saying to the teacher, "I'm sorry, but I've just been informed that I have to attend to a very important matter and I have to cut my visit short. I hope I'll be invited back another time." Then standing up and saying, "Now kids, I'm very sorry, but something very important has come up and I need to go deal with it. I'm going to try to come back another time and finish our visit. But until then I want you to promise me you'll listen to your teacher, work hard in school, and always do your best work. God bless you." I'll bet he could say all that in less than a minute...

SB: Russell Crowe and other Red Herrings aside, Bush was "frozen with indecision and fear", yet in order to dampen that uncomfortable reality Hitchens opts for the other extreme by invoking images of a crazed president leaping from his chair. But then even Moore isn't arguing what should have been, but rather what is. (General Sir Michael Rose, "A British General's View of Fahrenheit 9/11", Daily Mail, July 1, 2004)

MH: Again, Hitchens completely misses the point. The point is not about exactly what Bush should have done. Rather, Moore's point is to demonstrate that, in the absence of his handlers and media people, the President of the United States had absolutely know idea of what to do in that situation. And that's a pretty worrying thought for many Americans, not just for what it says about that particular issue, but for what it says about the general competence of the Commander in Chief.

The other half would be saying what they already say—that he knew the attack was coming, was using it to cement himself in power, and couldn't wait to get on with his coup.

SB: One half of the Michael Moore community this, the other half that. Hitchens will not accommodate the obvious and is thereby reduced to handwaving, hence there is absolutely no room for the well-supported view that the Bush administration was too busy salivating over Star Wars and Iraq to pay serious attention to warnings of a major terrorist attack, and that many of these same individuals consequently exploited the terrible events of September 11 to further their own interests.

This is the line taken by Gore Vidal and by a scandalous recent book that also revives the charge of FDR's collusion over Pearl Harbor. At least Moore's film should put the shameful purveyors of that last theory back in their paranoid box.

J9: Bringing up Clinton and Eisenhower and Russell Crowe and Michael Moore and Gore Vidal and FDR and Pearl Harbor has nothing to do with the documented fact that upon learning of the most serious terrorist attack on American soil our president was essentially paralyzed for almost seven minutes.

But it won't because it encourages their half-baked fantasies in so many other ways. We are introduced to Iraq, "a sovereign nation." (In fact, Iraq's "sovereignty" was heavily qualified by international sanctions, however questionable, which reflected its noncompliance with important U.N. resolutions.)

In this peaceable kingdom, according to Moore's flabbergasting choice of film shots, children are flying little kites, shoppers are smiling in the sunshine, and the gentle rhythms of life are undisturbed. Then—wham! From the night sky come the terror weapons of American imperialism. Watching the clips Moore uses, and recalling them well, I can recognize various Saddam palaces and military and police centers getting the treatment. But these sites are not identified as such. In fact, I don't think Al Jazeera would, on a bad day, have transmitted anything so utterly propagandistic. You would also be led to think that the term "civilian casualty" had not even been in the Iraqi vocabulary until March 2003. I remember asking Moore at Telluride if he was or was not a pacifist. He would not give a straight answer then, and he doesn't now, either. I'll just say that the "insurgent" side is presented in this film as justifiably outraged, whereas the 30-year record of Baathist war crimes and repression and aggression is not mentioned once. (Actually, that's not quite right. It is briefly mentioned but only, and smarmily, because of the bad period when Washington preferred Saddam to the likewise unmentioned Ayatollah Khomeini.)

-G: That "bad period" lasted, in some form or another, from the Baathist revolution (1967) all the way up to the Gulf War (1990).

MH: The only possible mitigation I can find for Moore in these scenes is that he was trying to show that, even under an often-brutal authoritarian, many people do in fact live fairly normal, day-to-day lives. Children play, people go to work, families sit around the table and laugh. This is true of just about any dictatorship. Moore was obviously also making the point that those most affected by conflicts such as this are often those, like children, who have done nothing wrong and who have no chance to avoid the carnage.

The fact that bombs were falling on Saddam's palaces and military centers, however, is irrelevant. Even the US military agrees that its weapons do not always hit their target, and that civilian deaths are an inevitable part of a campaign like this one. Moore never alleged that these civilian deaths were policy, and he also interviewed soldiers who lamented the civilian casualties but who said that they were unavoidable. The film simply pointed out that, whatever the motivations for the invasion or the intentions of the troops, there were some horrific consequences for thousands of Iraqi civilians. If you disagree that this has, in fact, been the case in Iraq, I guess there's nothing that Moore, or I, can say that would change your mind.

SB: Bombs will drift and missiles will go astray whether cameramen are on hand to capture the immediate fallout or not. Yet Hitchens is now going for the "out of sight, out of mind" model of argumentation. Astonishing.

During the Air War, missiles fired at Iraq instead hit Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria. Cruise missiles do not arm until they are relatively close the target area (so I was informed), but who, apart from Hitchens, would seriously doubt that such missiles also missed their mark in Iraq, blasting into adjacent buildings and landmarks? How about the more than fifty decapitation strikes that failed to hit a single one of their intended targets, or the destruction of electrical power distribution facilities (initially denied but later confirmed by a senior CENTCOM official), or the attacks on civilian telecommunications facilities, or the inappropriate targeting of ambiguous ground vehicles, or the extensive use of weapons of indiscriminate effect (nearly thirteen thousand cluster munitions, each containing a total of nearly two million sub munitions) that a Human Rights Watch report concludes killed and wounded more than one thousand civilians alone? According to their research, the coalition is believed to have left behind many tens of thousands of cluster munition duds.

And then there was a Ground War where untold numbers of paranoid solders grooved to the sound of music in the race to capture Baghdad. Scandalous.

J9: Moore's presentation seems to me a quite reasonable representation of what the impact of our attack was like for most Iraqis... [One] version of the story has been told over and over again. There's no question Saddam was a brutal oppressor. Moore does not owe equal time to the well-known atrocities of the Baathists. His point is that in weighing the costs of this war, particularly the moral ones, it's disingenuous to exclude the impact on the kids flying kites or being tossed mangled and dead into the backs of trucks, or the smiling shoppers, or the keening mothers. In Hitchens' black and white world this might be the "insurgent" side, but out here in the real world it's called the "human" side.

I-: Before the war, kids in Baghdad did ride bikes and fly kites and people did laugh and joke. ... After the war, formerly innocent playing children and their civilian mothers and fathers were wounded, maimed and killed. On what conceivable theory should a filmmaker who wants to show the horrors of this unnecessary war not juxtapose these images? On the theory that the war had to be fought? Well that's Hitchens' theory, not Moore's and the criticism here suffers from prescriptive diktat. Hitchens is welcome to make his own movie...

That this—his pro-American moment—was the worst Moore could possibly say of Saddam's depravity is further suggested by some astonishing falsifications.

SB: This is most certainly not the worst Moore could possibly say about Saddam's depravity. Moore is not presenting both sides of the story — only the one side he and millions of other people feel has not had a fair hearing in the mainstream media. Since falling out with Washington by invading the wrong dictator next door, we have had fourteen years of demonization (we would all be forgiven for thinking Iraq is comprised of twenty-four million people all named "Saddam"). Fourteen years of the usual suspects appearing on our television screens telling us how "Saddam" must be destroyed. Fourteen years of biased commentary from people with collective amnesia, telling us the reason we are hated is because we stand for democracy, freedom, and human rights in the world. Moore has openly admitted that his movie is a one-sided affair. Viewers are expected to go away, consider and test any new information they may have learned and weigh it against that which they are already aware.

Continued below...

Last edited by Stephen Birmingham on Sat Aug 28, 2004 1:58 pm; edited 30 times in total
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Stephen Birmingham



Joined: 22 Jan 2004
Posts: 16
Location: A tiny red brick house, some road, Liverpool, England, planet Earth

Posted: Wed Aug 18, 2004 12:15 am Post subject:
Moore asserts that Iraq under Saddam had never attacked or killed or even threatened (his words) any American.

SB: In fact Moore's narration is as follows:


On March 19, 2003, George W. Bush and the United States military invaded the sovereign nation of Iraq. A nation that had never attacked the United States. A nation that had never threatened to attack the United States. A nation that had never murdered a single American citizen.
Moore does not exactly say what Hitchens attributes to him, nevertheless Moore has got it slightly wrong. I suspect the message he meant to convey was: engagements resulting from the Gulf War and its tangled aftermath aside, Iraq has never attacked, nor threatened to mount an offensive attack against the United States.

Contrary to the many terrifying scenarios White House officials were feigning concern over during 2002-2003, Saddam did not possess any Unmanned Aerial Vehicles capable of spraying U.S. cities with deadly chemicals he did not retain. Saddam did not have the means to manufacture a nuclear device with which he could not pass to a notorious terrorist organisation he had no affiliation with (Osama wanted to build a Muslim force to protect Saudi Arabia and lead them in repelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990, and he has repeatedly denounced Saddam, calling for his overthrow and death). And even if Iraq did have these things, even if one-thousand, five-thousand, or twenty-thousand now sludge-filled munitions were buried in the sand somewhere, the case for war rested on yet another huge assumption, and one universally skated over: Saddam would have had to be suicidal to have launched an unprovoked attack on the most powerful nation in the world. He would have effectively signed his own death warrant, yet he was desperately trying to stave off an invasion, not start one.

As John Morrison, a top U.K. intelligence official, explains:


We have a very clear understanding of what threat is. It has to have two elements: a capability and an intention. If you've got the capability, as we have had for example to nuke France but not the intention, we don’t threaten France and vice versa. If some tin pot dictator would like to annihilate the British but has no capability to do so, he is not a threat. So a threat is made up of capability and intention. (John Ware, "Panorama: A failure of intelligence", BBC, July 11, 2004)
Saddam had neither the capability nor the intention.

I never quite know whether Moore is as ignorant as he looks, or even if that would be humanly possible. Baghdad was for years the official, undisguised home address of Abu Nidal, then the most-wanted gangster in the world, who had been sentenced to death even by the PLO and had blown up airports in Vienna and Rome.

SB: Moore's clanger provides Hitchens with another opportunity to remind people just how disgusting Saddam Hussein really was. But in doing so, Hitchens makes some bloopers of his own (see down). For now a few counter points.

The period to which Hitchens refers ("then the most-wanted gangster") was actually a time when the U.S. removed Iraq's name from a list of countries sponsoring terrorism. As Alan Friedman's excellent research establishes,


Secretary of State [Alexander] Haig was especially upset at the fact that the decision had been made at the White House, even though the State Department was responsible for the list. "I was not consulted," he complained. ... "We knew very well that Abu Nidal was based in Baghdad," [Howard] Teicher recalled. "We knew of Iraq's support for his and other terrorist organizations...". The removal of Iraq from the list set the tone for Washington's covert policies toward Baghdad. (Alan Friedman, "Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq", Bantam Books, 1993)
Abu Nidal's association with Baghdad did not deter France, the U.S., U.K. et al. from supporting Saddam, and for years, despite the embargo disallowing the sale of munitions to Iraq, both the White House and 10 Downing Street secretly channeled armaments and high-tech components to Iraq, sometimes directly, though extensively through false fronts and third parties such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and they encouraged closely guarded arms dealers and other private warriors to do the same (items that found their way to Iraq included gyroscopes, nuclear and chemical weapons technology, chemical warfare protective gear, artillery shells, cluster bombs, dumb bombs, even Soviet-made arms and equipment). Because of the cover-up, full details of what was exported to Baghdad, and how, remains unknown, even now. Saddam's depravity did not stop the U.K. training his military personnel, or halt the U.S. from later restoring full diplomatic ties and offering government-backed loan guarantees, or the sharing of intelligence information.


A few weeks later, the first U.S. satellite photographs were passed to Baghdad. ... At times, thanks to the White House's secret backing for the intelligence-sharing, U.S. intelligence officers were actually sent to Baghdad to help interpret the satellite information. As the White House took an increasingly active role in secretly helping Saddam direct his armed forces, the United States even built an expensive high-tech annex in Baghdad to provide a direct down-link receiver for the satellite intelligence and better processing of the information.

...

The American military commitment that had begun with intelligence-sharing expanded rapidly and surreptitiously throughout the Iran-Iraq war. A former White House official explained that "by 1987, our people were actually providing tactical military advice to the Iraqis in the battlefield, and sometimes they would find themselves over the Iranian boarder, alongside Iraqi troops." (Ibid)
Western policy makers aided and abetted a nation that was for years the undisguised home address of Abu Nidal, and the U.S. continues to train, support and harbour countless torturers and terrorists to this day.

Baghdad was the safe house for the man whose "operation" murdered Leon Klinghoffer.

SB: Yes, that will be Abu Abbass. Not everyone agrees with his significance. (Abu Abbass died in U.S. custody.)

Saddam boasted publicly of his financial sponsorship of suicide bombers in Israel. (Quite a few Americans of all denominations walk the streets of Jerusalem.)

SB: Like other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq occasionally offered financial assistance to Palestinian families who lost members during the occupation. This included some families of suicide bombers, though always after the fact, it should be noted. Bush was being dishonest when he argued that Iraq was an obstacle blocking peace in the Middle East (followed by Iran, Syria next, and so on). The real problem is that western leaders premised The Roadmap to Peace on the notion that the issue that needs to be solved is the resistance to Israel's occupation of Palestine, and not the illegal occupation itself.

In 1991, a large number of Western hostages were taken by the hideous Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and held in terrible conditions for a long time. After that same invasion was repelled—Saddam having killed quite a few Americans and Egyptians and Syrians and Brits in the meantime and having threatened to kill many more—the Iraqi secret police were caught trying to murder former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. Never mind whether his son should take that personally. (Though why should he not?) Should you and I not resent any foreign dictatorship that attempts to kill one of our retired chief executives? (President Clinton certainly took it that way: He ordered the destruction by cruise missiles of the Baathist "security" headquarters.)

SB: And he killed eight civilians, including one of Iraq's best-known female artists, Leila Attar. Astonishingly, Clinton passed judgment — by way of twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles — before the trial of the alleged plotters was concluded. And that is to say nothing about the "dubious evidence" or of a trial conducted in Kuwait with its abominable justice system. (Quoted Seymour M. Hersh, "A Case Not Closed", The New Yorker, November 11, 1993)

Iraqi forces fired, every day, for 10 years, on the aircraft that patrolled the no-fly zones and staved off further genocide in the north and south of the country.

SB: Iraqi forces fired at the aircraft in its skies because the no-fly zones (NFZs) were illegal. What concerned most people about the NFZs, however, was not Saddam's resistance to them, it was the manner in which they were constantly abused. And quite how the no-fly zones staved off further genocide in the country Hitchens doesn't bother to say — the U.S. certainly didn't bother taking advantage of its overwhelming air superiority to assist the uprising of 1991, when it mattered so much. The sanctions, which were anything but smart, quickly gutted Saddam's military capability and much else besides (Iraq soon had no operable air force). The reality is that one possible means of suppressing a population was substituted for mass death and decay of a different kind. Genocide, only this time by sanctions, the very thing Hitchens incorrectly thinks the no-fly zones sought to prevent.

In 1993, a certain Mr. Yasin helped mix the chemicals for the bomb at the World Trade Center and then skipped to Iraq, where he remained a guest of the state until the overthrow of Saddam.

SB: After the bombing the FBI questioned Abdul Rahman Yasin, an American of Iraqi descent, characterised him as co-operative and then let him go. He travelled to Iraq where, according to Tariq Aziz, he lived for a year before being arrested by Iraqi intelligence agents in 1994. Aziz told 60 Minutes that Iraq twice attempted to hand Yasin over to the U.S. authorities, once in 1994 and again shortly after the September 11th attacks:


Tariq Aziz: Twice we asked them [the U.S.] to come and take him and twice they refused. Which means that they are not sincere in what they are saying, they are not honest in what they are saying.

...

Lesley Stahl: How did you get that word [a more specific offer] to the Americans?

Tariq Aziz: Through two parties; two governments. I am not going to mention names because they asked us not to mention their names. But the Americans know.

[The third party] told the Americans that Yasin is in Iraq and that the Iraqi authorities are ready to deliver him to the American authorities if the American government sends a team to Baghdad. The American government said, no, we are not going to send a team to Baghdad but we are ready to receive him in the capital of that government.

Lesley Stahl: Of this third country?

Tariq Aziz: We said, okay, we will take the man to the capital of that country and deliver him to the American authorities. But, they should sign a paper that they have received Yasin from the Iraqi authorities in the presence of the third party. They refused to sign the paper and therefore the delivery did not go through. (Lesley Stahl, "Transcript: The Yasin Interview", CBS 60 Minutes, June 2, 2002)
U.S. authorities only saw fit to add Abdul Yasin to their "most wanted" terrorist list in late September 2001 (not 1993). Many observers have reasonably speculated that Yasin had more propaganda value to the Bush administration if he was still in Iraq when they were desperately attempting to rally support for the latest bombing campaign and subsequent ground invasion. Later a document emerged that purported to show Yasin was on the Iraqi payroll, but the authenticity of this particular document, like so many others, is widely disputed. Some experts think it more likely that Yasin was freely housed in Iraq, and not locked away as claimed, on condition that he report his whereabouts at periodic intervals to the appropriate authorities.

In 2001, Saddam's regime was the only one in the region that openly celebrated the attacks on New York and Washington and described them as just the beginning of a larger revenge.

SB: Crowing is one thing, actually planning and executing attacks against the most powerful nation on the planet is another thing entirely.

Its official media regularly spewed out a stream of anti-Semitic incitement. I think one might describe that as "threatening," even if one was narrow enough to think that anti-Semitism only menaces Jews. And it was after, and not before, the 9/11 attacks that Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi moved from Afghanistan to Baghdad and began to plan his now very open and lethal design for a holy and ethnic civil war.

SB: This is also a favourite theme of Vice President Dick Cheney:


And you can look at Zarkawi, [Abu Mussab] al-Zarkawi, who is still out there operating today, who was an al-Qaeda associate, who was wounded in Afghanistan, took refuge in Baghdad, working out of Baghdad, worked with the Ansar al-Islam group up in northeastern Iraq, that produced a so-called poison factory, a group that we hit when we went into Iraq ... We haven't really had the time yet to pore through all those records in Baghdad. We'll find ample evidence confirming the link, that is the connection if you will between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi intelligence services. (M.E. Sprengelmeyer, "Transcript of interview with Vice President Dick Cheney", Rocky Mountain News, January 9, 2004)
While Cheney's men are still rummaging amid ruins for more records to examine, it is important to consider the evidence that both he and Hitchens have neglected, and that is that Mullah Krekar, one of Ansar al-Islam's spiritual leaders, has repeatedly denounced Saddam Hussein. Further, Ansar al-Islam operated not in Saddam Hussein's sphere of influence but in the Kurdish/U.S.-controlled geographic area of Iraqi Kurdistan. No poisons were ever discovered at the rundown camp. According to a number of current and former U.S. intelligence officials, Iraq created a special group with the aim of destroying these people. As former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter explains:


Iraqi defectors have been talking lately about the training camp at Salman Pak, south of Baghdad. They say there's a Boeing aircraft there. That's not true. There's an Antonov aircraft of Russian manufacture. They say there are railroad mock-ups, bus mock-ups, buildings, and so on. These are all things you'd find in a hostage rescue training camp, which is what this camp was when it was built in the mid-1980s with British intelligence supervision. In fact, British SAS special operations forces were sent to help train the Iraqis in hostage rescue techniques. Any nation with a national airline and that is under attack from terrorists — and Iraq was, from Iran and Syria at the time — would need this capability. Iraq operated Salman Pak as a hostage rescue training facility up until 1992. In 1992, because Iraq no longer had a functioning airline, and because their railroad system was inoperative, Iraq turned the facility over to the Iraqi Intelligence service, particularly the Department of External Threats. These are documented facts coming out of multiple sources from a variety of different countries. The Department of External Threats was created to deal with Kurdistan, in particular, the infusion of Islamic fundamentalist elements from Iran into Kurdistan. So, rather than being a camp dedicated to train Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, it was a camp dedicated to train Iraq to deal with Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.

And they did so. Their number one target was the Islamic Kurdish party, which later grew into Al Ansar. Now, Jeff Goldberg claimed in the New Yorker that Al Ansar is funded by the Iraqi Intelligence service. But that's exactly the opposite of reality: the Iraqis have been fighting Al Ansar for years now. Ansar comes out of Iran and is supported by Iranians. Iraq, as part of their ongoing war against Islamic fundamentalism, created a unit specifically designed to destroy these people. (Scott Ritter and William Rivers Pitt, "War on Iraq: what team Bush doesn't want you to know", Context Books, 2002)
It is widely accepted that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi received medical treatment in Baghdad for a leg wound. Indeed, other well-travelled individuals in and around Iraq may have inadvertently come in to contact with al-Qaeda sympathizers or supporters. If you look at the geography of the region it is not unreasonable to conclude that supporters were/are active in Iraq. But from this it is unreasonable to conclude that the former Iraqi regime was aware of their presence or that they had any meaningful relationship with them.

We also know that al-Qaeda cells operated in the United States — an equivalent leap in logic would therefore be to claim that al-Qaeda has ties to the Bush administration merely because of their presence in that country (shall we bomb the U.S. too?)

On Dec. 1, 2003, the New York Times reported—and the David Kay report had established—that Saddam had been secretly negotiating with the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il in a series of secret meetings in Syria, as late as the spring of 2003, to buy a North Korean missile system, and missile-production system, right off the shelf. (This attempt was not uncovered until after the fall of Baghdad, the coalition's presence having meanwhile put an end to the negotiations.)

SB: According to some reports, negotiations for the Rodong missile system (which its prohibited range) appear to have stalled long before the build-up of troops, with North Korea just using the coalition presence as yet another excuse so as not to complete the deal. In any case, in light of recent events I think it would be foolish in the extreme to uncritically accept the conclusions of the Iraqi Survey Group when their work remains largely untested (peer review? bah!). David Kay's October 2003 statement has already drawn valid criticism and shunned weapons inspectors and other experts no longer see any justification in giving the Bush administrations handpicked analysts the benefit of their well-grounded doubt.

Thus, in spite of the film's loaded bias against the work of the mind, you can grasp even while watching it that Michael Moore has just said, in so many words, the one thing that no reflective or informed person can possibly believe: that Saddam Hussein was no problem. No problem at all.

I-: Hitchens' obtuseness, his bluntness, reaches self-parodying heights in taking on Moore's quite- needing-improvement comments that Iraq never attacked or killed an American. So we get from Hitchens hundreds of words in educating Moore as to Hussein's wretched murderousness and direct and indirect support of terror. Moore's maladroitly made point in about fifteen words or less is clearly that Iraq posed no imminent threat to America, the serious position of many serious people. So, again, rather than grant Moore his entirely reasonable artistic and thematic premise, and evaluate what he does cinematically with it, Hitchens is absurdly literal and cannot contain his own well-justified outrage at Hussein's ghastly horrors so as to deal fairly with what Moore does as filmmaker.

J9: Hitchens miraculously misses Moore's point once again. It's not that Saddam was "no problem at all," it's that he had nothing to do with September 11. Assuming we want to get to the bottom of 9/11, we went after the wrong guy, which is why Moore raises the question of whether getting to the bottom of 9/11 has ever been Bush's goal.

JS: Hitchens pretends that Moore is arguing that Saddam Hussein presented "no problem" to America or the world. "No problem at all." (His snide emphasis.) ... Moore isn't arguing that Saddam was a sweetie or that Iraq's most dangerous weapon was a kite. He's saying Saddam is maybe fifth (if we're generous) out of the most threatening people to America, when we take into account not only his actions and his beliefs but also his means to do specific harm to Americans. If Hussein were really as dangerous to America as we've been told, then why the need to cook up this Iraq/Al Qaeda connection? ... If he's really so dangerous, you shouldn't have to fib to make the case for taking him out. The reality is, he never posed an imminent threat to Americans in America, and that made the invasion unwarranted and preemptive. Which I agree with Moore is a very dangerous precedent to set.

Now look again at the facts I have cited above. If these things had been allowed to happen under any other administration, you can be sure that Moore and others would now glibly be accusing the president of ignoring, or of having ignored, some fairly unmistakable "warnings."

J9: Hitchens' speculation about these things being "allowed to happen under any other administration" itself raises the question of whether Hitchens is as ignorant as Moore looks, since they were allowed to happen — and sometimes supported — under several administrations.

The same "let's have it both ways" opportunism infects his treatment of another very serious subject, namely domestic counterterrorist policy. From being accused of overlooking too many warnings—not exactly an original point—the administration is now lavishly taunted for issuing too many. (Would there not have been "fear" if the harbingers of 9/11 had been taken seriously?)

JS: [Hitchens] criticizes Moore's assertion that Bush overlooked 9/11 warnings as "not exactly an original point." Well, no. It isn't. The 9/11 Commission thought of it first. But this isn't Die Hard. It's not a scripted movie where originality is key. He's just presenting his case. Was Moore supposed to leave out the "Bin Laden Determined To Attack In U.S." memo because it's "been done"? Oh, don't mention the Iraq war, people have already covered that one. What?! If these are the criticisms you're leveling against Fahrenheit 9/11 then it's clear that you just hate it and that's all there is.

SB: Hitchens first criticises Moore for leaving information out, then he accuses him of being unoriginal. Moore can't win.

OB: Moore suggests that overlooking a Presidential Daily Briefing, Richard Clarke running around with his head on fire, and other FBI leads was a devastating error on the part of the administration. Another kind of warning, "homeland security warnings," Moore suggests, exist for the purpose of creating a state of fear. He suggests that such warnings are silly. These are different kinds of warnings, Chris. Moore doesn’t stick them together in an over generality. But you do. And then you criticize yourself for making an overbroad generalization. One cannot understand the specificity of the two different kinds of warnings here and accuse Moore of a contradiction. But by ignoring the film, and substituting your misgeneralization, you achieve success at criticizing yourself again!

MH: Here Hitchens is just plainly misrepresenting the case. The first problem with Hitchens' critique here is that it fails to take account of the temporal factor (i.e. when these things happened). A key point made by the film is that the administration ignored warnings that it received before 9/11 about the possibility of Al Qaeda attacks, specifically involving commercial airliners. The argument is that, had these warnings been taken more seriously, then maybe 9/11 could have been avoided by increasing appropriate security measures. The assertions about issuing too many security warnings and putting the population under constant fear of attack refer to the period since 9/11, when so many of the "security warnings" have offered nothing more specific than vague and nebulous exhortations to "be alert" or "report any suspicious activity." Hitchens seems unable to formulate the logical position that many Americans have been taking for the past few years, and one that Moore is supporting in his film: Security measures are good if they are actually likely to prevent or uncover a threat, and if they are based on good intelligence. But security measures that do nothing but irritate people and/or infringe on their liberty for no noticeable gain in actual safety should be discouraged.

J9: Here Hitchens seems unable to draw the distinction between overlooking intelligence of a gathering terrorist threat and warnings issued to the population at large. I would hope that our intelligence professionals charged with such matters are smart enough and capable enough to operate covertly to dismantle terrorist plots... So, in answer to his question, ["Would there not have been "fear" if the harbingers of 9/11 had been taken seriously?"] no, taking the harbingers of 9/11 seriously would ideally have led to covert operations so as not to (1) alarm the public, (2) reveal the extent of our intelligence, and (3) provide any sort of moral victory to the enemy for scaring us.

We are shown some American civilians who have had absurd encounters with idiotic "security" staff. (Have you ever met anyone who can't tell such a story?) Then we are immediately shown underfunded police departments that don't have the means or the manpower to do any stop-and-search: a power suddenly demanded by Moore on their behalf that we know by definition would at least lead to some ridiculous interrogations. Finally, Moore complains that there isn't enough intrusion and confiscation at airports and says that it is appalling that every air traveler is not forcibly relieved of all matches and lighters. (Cue mood music for sinister influence of Big Tobacco.) So—he wants even more pocket-rummaging by airport officials? Uh, no, not exactly. But by this stage, who's counting? Moore is having it three ways and asserting everything and nothing. Again—simply not serious.

MH: This continues from the last point, but I had to address it specifically because Hitchens completely elides the context. Moore points out that experts believe that, had the shoe bomber Richard Reid has a butane lighter instead of matches, he might well have succeeded in blowing up his plane. Yet people are still allowed to take lighters onto planes, but a woman was forced to drink two ounces of her own breast milk in order to prove that it was okay. Was the latter just an overzealous official? Sure. But the fact remains that, even if you don't have a bomb in your shoe, you could do significantly more damage with a lighter that with many of the things that are not allowed on airplanes. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that lighting a fire in the confined environment of an airplane cabin might cause some real problems. Moore is just pointing out that, in many cases, security measures and resources are not being well directed.

J9: To answer [Hitchens'] question, yes, I have met people who have not had absurd encounters with idiotic security staff, namely, myself. I don't recall any police in the film complaining they didn't have the funding or manpower to perform stop-and-searches. I do recall an Oregon state trooper driving along a stretch of coastal highway he said he was able to patrol something like once a week, and another saying that on a particular night there was something like nine state troopers on duty for the entire state of Oregon. I also don't recall Moore saying anything about wanting more intrusion at the airports. He does point out that four books of matches and two lighters is far more than shoe bomber Richard Reid needed and that Big Tobacco has the clearest incentive and means to influence this policy. Have you ever seen what you can do with a match and a can of hairspray? Instant flame thrower.

CP: By pointing out the ridiculous stories of encounters with overzealous security staff, then pointing out that the State of Oregon only has eight state troopers on duty at certain times through the week, leaving huge swathes of coastline unprotected, then pointing out that three matchbooks and two lighters is a-okay to take on a plane but four matchbooks and two lighters is not (despite the evidence showing that shoebomber Richard Reid would have succeeded in blowing up a civilian flight if he'd had access to a lighter), Moore is making a very salient point. That point is that homeland security is a joke. You can see that, right? Because I saw it clearly. Is it just me?

Circling back to where we began, why did Moore's evil Saudis not join "the Coalition of the Willing"? Why instead did they force the United States to switch its regional military headquarters to Qatar? If the Bush family and the al-Saud dynasty live in each other's pockets, as is alleged in a sort of vulgar sub-Brechtian scene with Arab headdresses replacing top hats, then how come the most reactionary regime in the region has been powerless to stop Bush from demolishing its clone in Kabul and its buffer regime in Baghdad? The Saudis hate, as they did in 1991, the idea that Iraq's recuperated oil industry might challenge their near-monopoly. They fear the liberation of the Shiite Muslims they so despise. To make these elementary points is to collapse the whole pathetic edifice of the film's "theory." Perhaps Moore prefers the pro-Saudi Kissinger/Scowcroft plan for the Middle East, where stability trumps every other consideration and where one dare not upset the local house of cards, or killing-field of Kurds? This would be a strange position for a purported radical. Then again, perhaps he does not take this conservative line because his real pitch is not to any audience member with a serious interest in foreign policy. It is to the provincial isolationist.

SB: This is a dishonest criticism because Moore never suggests that the Saudis are in a position to control U.S. policy.

It would be more accurate, productive, plus a whole lot easier if Hitchens simply were to argue that Moore has somewhat overstated the Bush-Saudi connection and concede the middle ground. Yet he still clings to the irrational notion of altruistic U.S. intentions in the Gulf, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

According to Hitchens, "however compromised and shameful the American starting point was" on the morning of September 11, the U.S. government suddenly found itself at war with reactionary forces. In a moment of moral clarity, it quickly calculated that it could see off a number of enemies with a series of benign interventions — it could free Afghanistan from the Taliban and overturn Saddam's atrocious regime and recuperate the Iraqi oil industry, thereby breaking the oil monopoly the Saudis now enjoy. Breaking the Saudi monopoly is an important part of the strategy, says Hitchens, since "we now know so much how Saudi Arabia is not our friend, but is a particularly deadly, mean, and vicious enemy". Just one problem. It would appear that nobody has informed the Bush clan of this strategy.


David Frost: And some people say oil has something to do with, we want in fact Iraqi oil to be available if the Saudi oil becomes unavailable because of an overthrow there. Is that hegemony part of the plan do you think?

George Bush Snr.: No, I think in some quarters in our country people seem to want to make an enemy out of Saudi Arabia. Thank God our President doesn't feel that way. He has a wonderful relationship with Crown Prince Abdullah. (David Frost, "Interview with George Bush Snr.", BBC Breakfast with Frost, September 14, 2003)
Bush the elder is keen to refute any suggestion of a split in relations, and for obvious reasons. The conflict of interest is clear. Moore's argument is clear. Yet Hitchens continues to defend his new friends in Washington by erecting and attacking a straw man Moore.

I have already said that Moore's film has the staunch courage to mock Bush for his verbal infelicity. Yet it's much, much braver than that. From Fahrenheit 9/11 you can glean even more astounding and hidden disclosures, such as the capitalist nature of American society, the existence of Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex," and the use of "spin" in the presentation of our politicians. It's high time someone had the nerve to point this out. There's more. Poor people often volunteer to join the army, and some of them are duskier than others. Betcha didn't know that. Back in Flint, Mich., Moore feels on safe ground. There are no martyred rabbits this time. Instead, it's the poor and black who shoulder the packs and rifles and march away. I won't dwell on the fact that black Americans have fought for almost a century and a half, from insisting on their right to join the U.S. Army and fight in the Civil War to the right to have a desegregated Army that set the pace for post-1945 civil rights. I'll merely ask this: In the film, Moore says loudly and repeatedly that not enough troops were sent to garrison Afghanistan and Iraq. (This is now a favorite cleverness of those who were, in the first place, against sending any soldiers at all.)

CP: Uh, no. He doesn't. He says not enough troops were sent to Afghanistan — which is correct, evidenced by the fact that we didn't catch Osama Bin Laden, who killed 3000 of our own. But Moore is not saying there should have been more troops sent to Iraq, he's saying that the US went in underprepared. There's a big difference between the two positions — one says "we should flood the country with our men and get the bastards!" while the other says, "You idiots, you sent our kids in there, in numbers too small to effectively control the place, when you shouldn't have been sending in troops at all!" The latter is Moore's point, and it's a very clear one.

Well, where does he think those needful heroes and heroines would have come from? Does he favor a draft—the most statist and oppressive solution? Does he think that only hapless and gullible proles sign up for the Marines? Does he think—as he seems to suggest—that parents can "send" their children, as he stupidly asks elected members of Congress to do? Would he have abandoned Gettysburg because the Union allowed civilians to pay proxies to serve in their place? Would he have supported the antidraft (and very antiblack) riots against Lincoln in New York? After a point, one realizes that it's a waste of time asking him questions of this sort. It would be too much like taking him seriously. He'll just try anything once and see if it floats or flies or gets a cheer.

MH: Hitchens again conflates two issues and pretends that they can only be considered together as a single one. First he repeats his stupid argument suggesting that it is logically inconsistent to both oppose sending troops, and then to argue that, if troops are going to be sent, then there should be enough to do the job. ... Hitchens also makes a nod to Moore's argument about class representation in the military without actually appreciating its significance. Hitchens asks, "Does he think ... that parents can "send" their children, as he stupidly asks elected members of Congress to do?" Well, no Christopher, he doesn't. And that's entirely the point of this rhetorical flourish in the movie. Moore is making a point about choice and options in America, and noting that, of the politicians who make the decisions to send American troops into combat, only one actually has a son or daughter in [Iraq].

Actually, the most interesting part of that Hitchens paragraph is his question about the draft. Sure, it is a "statist and oppressive solution," but it's also one that, if fully implemented with no loopholes for the rich, might actually make some people think harder about whether or not to send troops to areas where they don't need to be.

J9: Since Hitchens won't dwell on blacks soldiering for about the last 150 years, let us not dwell on blacks being at the bottom of the economic ladder for those very same 150 years... As to Hitchens' draft question, he really should consider a fencing career, for he once again sidesteps Moore's point brilliantly. In plain English, by saying that not enough troops were sent doesn't mean we don't have enough troops, it means not enough were sent. The draft question belongs to Hitchens, not Moore. As for who signs up, Moore clearly points out that recruiting is a sales job and that the prospects are not evenly distributed.

Indeed, Moore's affected and ostentatious concern for black America is one of the most suspect ingredients of his pitch package. In a recent interview, he yelled that if the hijacked civilians of 9/11 had been black, they would have fought back, unlike the stupid and presumably cowardly white men and women (and children). Never mind for now how many black passengers were on those planes—we happen to know what Moore does not care to mention: that Todd Beamer and a few of his co-passengers, shouting "Let's roll," rammed the hijackers with a trolley, fought them tooth and nail, and helped bring down a United Airlines plane, in Pennsylvania, that was speeding toward either the White House or the Capitol. There are no words for real, impromptu bravery like that, which helped save our republic from worse than actually befell. The Pennsylvania drama also reminds one of the self-evident fact that this war is not fought only "overseas" or in uniform, but is being brought to our cities. Yet Moore is a silly and shady man who does not recognize courage of any sort even when he sees it because he cannot summon it in himself. To him, easy applause, in front of credulous audiences, is everything.

MH: If Moore indeed says what Hitchens attributes to him in the second sentence, then it was a really stupid thing to say. But I don't believe that Moore demonstrated an "affected and ostentatious concern for black America" in this film. In fact, if I had to name the social category most prominent in this film, it would probably be "class," not race. Not only does Moore focus on the lack of options for the poor, but he also has some great footage of Bush describing his supporters as "the haves and the have-mores," and as "my base."

So, is this film biased? Sure it is. Moore would happily agree. Moreover, like his other films, it does have some very problematic sections, which I have referred to in this post. But much of Hitchens' critique contains the same lack of objectivity, and the same selective use of summary and quotation, of which he accuses Moore. Most importantly, in his attempts to smear Moore, Hitchens either conveniently misses or intentionally obscures many of the films most salient points.

Contined below...

Last edited by Stephen Birmingham on Sat Aug 28, 2004 2:01 pm; edited 10 times in total
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Stephen Birmingham



Joined: 22 Jan 2004
Posts: 16
Location: A tiny red brick house, some road, Liverpool, England, planet Earth

Posted: Wed Aug 18, 2004 12:28 am Post subject:
Moore has announced that he won't even appear on TV shows where he might face hostile questioning. I notice from the New York Times of June 20 that he has pompously established a rapid response team, and a fact-checking staff, and some tough lawyers, to bulwark himself against attack. He'll sue, Moore says, if anyone insults him or his pet. Some right-wing hack groups, I gather, are planning to bring pressure on their local movie theaters to drop the film. How dumb or thuggish do you have to be in order to counter one form of stupidity and cowardice with another? By all means go and see this terrible film, and take your friends, and if the fools in the audience strike up one cry, in favor of surrender or defeat, feel free to join in the conversation.

However, I think we can agree that the film is so flat-out phony that "fact-checking" is beside the point.

CP: Excuse me? What did he just say? "Fact-checking is beside the point"? No sir, fact checking is the point when you accuse someone of lying. And you, sir, have not proved one single lie here, only a bunch of inferences that exist in your head and nowhere else. Hitchens is saying that Fahrenheit 9/11 is an awful movie simply because it doesn't take his perspective on things. He claims lies have been told, but can only find one statement that could even be inferred as untrue — and even that's a stretch. As for the rest, he seems to think if he can smear a little doody on Michael Moore's reputation at the top of the article, he doesn't have to prove it in the bottom.

And as for the scary lawyers—get a life, or maybe see me in court. But I offer this, to Moore and to his rapid response rabble. Any time, Michael my boy. Let's redo Telluride. Any show. Any place. Any platform. Let's see what you're made of.

NM: Moore is not as articulate and well presented as Hitchens in public, and therefore the impetus for Hitchens challenging Moore to a debate is already a loaded contest. I’m sure that Hitchens would slay someone like me in a debate also. ... Hitchens happens to be well composed and well spoken on camera, and his inventory of facts on numerous issues would surely be a daunting edifice to confront. ... Moore is a bit like a diesel truck and he takes time to warm up and get his points moving...

It does not matter what Moore is made of. We are not a bunch of gangsters sizing each other up. We’re not kids on the playground drawing lines in the dirt.

Some people soothingly say that one should relax about all this. It's only a movie. No biggie. It's no worse than the tomfoolery of Oliver Stone. It's kick-ass entertainment. It might even help get out "the youth vote." Yeah, well, I have myself written and presented about a dozen low-budget made-for-TV documentaries, on subjects as various as Mother Teresa and Bill Clinton and the Cyprus crisis, and I also helped produce a slightly more polished one on Henry Kissinger that was shown in movie theaters. So I know, thanks, before you tell me, that a documentary must have a "POV" or point of view and that it must also impose a narrative line. But if you leave out absolutely everything that might give your "narrative" a problem and throw in any old rubbish that might support it, and you don't even care that one bit of that rubbish flatly contradicts the next bit, and you give no chance to those who might differ, then you have betrayed your craft.

MJ: Moore has said that his film has the character of an op-ed piece. He's right. Furthermore, Moore leaves out scores of pertinent facts and perspectives that are essential to a full understanding why George W. Bush and the foreign policy of his administration are a disaster for the United States. I scarcely know how to characterize the quantity of material that he could have included, but did not...

As for historical facts that Moore could have included but didn't, here are just a few, in no particular order: Bush's spurning of the U.N. to make war on Iraq, in violation of the U.N. Charter; Bush's trampling of traditional American alliances; the stimulus Bush has provided to global anti-Americanism; Bush's embrace of the Likud Party in the Israel-Palestine conflict; Bush's gargantuan pandering to the military-industrial complex through vastly increased 'defense' budgets.

As for analytical perspectives Moore could have brought in but didn't, here are just a few: the neoconservative hijacking of U.S. foreign policy in the Bush presidency by the Project for a New American Century crowd, not even mentioned by the film; the rejection by the U.S. of international law and the issue of war crimes; Bush's religious zealotry; Bush's scorn for the United States Constitution and U.S. law; Bush's embrace of militarism; the avoidance of military service by Bush and others in his administration (alluded to in the film, but scarcely developed).

If you flatter and fawn upon your potential audience, I might add, you are patronizing them and insulting them. By the same token, if I write an article and I quote somebody and for space reasons put in an ellipsis like this (…), I swear on my children that I am not leaving out anything that, if quoted in full, would alter the original meaning or its significance. Those who violate this pact with readers or viewers are to be despised.

J9: I suppose we are to assume therefore Hitchens despises Bush, since I can think of a State of the Union or two, not to mention a few other speeches and documents spawned under our current administration, that seem to be missing a few dot-dot-dots.

At no point does Michael Moore make the smallest effort to be objective. At no moment does he pass up the chance of a cheap sneer or a jeer.

J9: No, Moore doesn't attempt to be objective and he doesn't pass up cheap shots. But the fact is, neither do the people he attacks. I see no reason for Moore to abide by Hitchens' double standard. Get over it.

He pitilessly focuses his camera, for minutes after he should have turned it off, on a distraught and bereaved mother whose grief we have already shared. (But then, this is the guy who thought it so clever and amusing to catch Charlton Heston, in Bowling for Columbine, at the onset of his senile dementia.) Such courage.

SB: Lila Lipscomb had the authority to withdraw any part of the film that included her and her family and she maintains she was not manipulated: "Manipulation, no" she said. "If you want manipulation look at the White House." (Donn M. Fresard, "Military mom in 'Fahrenheit 9/11' speaks to crowd at weekend screening", The Michigan Daily, July 06, 2004)

Why is Hitchens holding Moore to a higher standard than he holds the President of the United States?

Perhaps vaguely aware that his movie so completely lacks gravitas, Moore concludes with a sonorous reading of some words from George Orwell. The words are taken from 1984 and consist of a third-person analysis of a hypothetical, endless, and contrived war between three superpowers. The clear intention, as clumsily excerpted like this (...) is to suggest that there is no moral distinction between the United States, the Taliban, and the Baath Party and that the war against jihad is about nothing. If Moore had studied a bit more, or at all, he could have read Orwell really saying, and in his own voice, the following:


The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply humanitarians who object to taking life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point. But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists, whose real though unacknowledged motive appears to be hatred of western democracy and admiration for totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writing of the younger intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States …
And that's just from Orwell's Notes on Nationalism in May 1945.

KW: Hitchens responds to Moore's quote by counter-quoting Orwell's famous article where he claims "pacifism is objectively pro-fascist". ... Hitchens accuses Moore of leaving out uncomfortable facts, but here again Hitchens is omitting a boatload of facts himself. At the time Orwell wrote that, he was a revolutionary socialist — and at least part of his motivation for that article was to say that if the British proletariat weren't roused to join World War II, then they would be missing out on a fantastic opportunity to violently overthrow the capitalist system. In order to win the war against the Hun, "the London gutters will have to run with blood" of the capitalists, said Orwell. ... Furthermore, it's pretty well-documented that Orwell recanted this stance later in life, allowing that:


In 1944 he confessed that he had been driven to use language he regretted by "the lunatic atmosphere of war," and later that year specifically rejected the use of the phrase "objectively pro-Fascist" to smear people who are not fascists at all, but who do things which others believe are helpful to fascism. ...toward the end of his life [Orwell] became close friends with Julian Symons and George Woodcock, two of the pacifists he had originally denounced.
Orwell changed his mind about pacifism after the war was over. However, it's worth noting that Orwell never did retract his book 1984, which was about the usefulness of war hysteria in order to crush dissent and freedom.

J9: Last paragraphs. Hitchens again tries to fit Moore with the pacifist, relativist collar. Again he fails. The Orwell quotation reads "In accordance with the principles of double-think it does not matter if the war is not real. For when it is, victory is not possible. The war is not meant to be won, but it is meant to be continuous." Moore's point is that this war is not about what Bush says it's about. Bush has sold us a war with an invisible enemy that is everywhere and nowhere, posing an imminent yet gathering threat...

Yet to view Moore as a pacifist — even a practically omnipotent one — is to completely misread both him and the phenomenon of his movie. He clearly states at the end of the film that the people who are willing to put their lives on the line to defend the rest of us deserve one thing above all else, and that is not to be put in harm's way on false pretenses. The movie's message isn't that war is wrong, it's that Bush is wrong. Wrong for the country. Wrong for the world. Wrong for the present. Wrong for the future. Alas, honorable, or not, so is Hitchens.

A short word of advice: In general, it's highly unwise to quote Orwell if you are already way out of your depth on the question of moral equivalence. It's also incautious to remind people of Orwell if you are engaged in a sophomoric celluloid rewriting of recent history.

KW: The "moral relativism" argument holds zero weight with me. I'm not trying to say that America is as bad as the Taliban, and neither is Moore, I suspect. Another distortion by the dualists (Either we're a despicable villain, or we're Prince Gallahad...) What we are saying is, that we are not responsible for the sins of the terrorists, but we as American citizens are responsible for the carnage and "collateral damage" inflicted on innocents by our own country. There has to be another way.

If Michael Moore had had his way, Slobodan Milosevic would still be the big man in a starved and tyrannical Serbia. Bosnia and Kosovo would have been cleansed and annexed. If Michael Moore had been listened to, Afghanistan would still be under Taliban rule, and Kuwait would have remained part of Iraq. And Iraq itself would still be the personal property of a psychopathic crime family, bargaining covertly with the slave state of North Korea for WMD. You might hope that a retrospective awareness of this kind would induce a little modesty. To the contrary, it is employed to pump air into one of the great sagging blimps of our sorry, mediocre, celeb-rotten culture. Rock the vote, indeed.

KW: No, Mr. Hitchens, no, no, and I take offense when you say that. Once again you are looking into a dimestore crystal ball and then passing off naked speculation as if it were fact.

Neither I, Michael Moore, nor virtually any other anti-war protester approved of the reign of Saddam (or the Taliban, or Milosevic, etc.) That was not part of our rhetoric nor intent. I, Michael Moore, and virtually every other anti-war protester rejoice with relief that Saddam and the others are gone. Our position was only that an invasion was not an appropriate way to accomplish it. Removing Saddam is a major step forward. But the "collateral damage" which accompanied the war is an even more major step backwards. Killing [over] 3,000 Afghan civilians; the deaths of upwards of 8,000 Iraqi civillians; killing probably fifty thousand arguably innocent conscript soldiers (the real Iraqi villains escaped to the hills and sent peasants as cannon fodder against our smart bombs); inflaming sentiment against us throughout the Arab world, and increasing Al-Qaida recruitment; the devolution of America's reputation and her treatment of civil rights at home and abroad — these are hugely negative consequences that threaten America far more than Saddam ever did, and these were all easily predicted consequences.

Of course, we did predict these things, but the pro-war crowd simply brushed off our concerns with talk of Iraqis throwing roses. Because the real-life situation has conformed so closely with our predictions, and not theirs, the only way the pro-war crowd can criticize us is to ignore what we said and engage in speculation.

Last edited by Stephen Birmingham on Fri Aug 27, 2004 5:20 pm; edited 3 times in total
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Stephen Birmingham



Joined: 22 Jan 2004
Posts: 16
Location: A tiny red brick house, some road, Liverpool, England, planet Earth

Posted: Wed Aug 18, 2004 10:45 pm Post subject:
Links to some sources:

Unfairenheit 9/11 - The lies of Michael Moore Christopher Hitchens
This film couldn't be Moore wrong Christopher Hitchens

Better late than Hitchens jeesh999 (J9)
Hitchens on Fahrenheit 9/11 Itzik (I-)
Bewarenheit 9/11 - The lies of Christopher Hitchens Jameson Simmons (JS)
A review of Unfairenheit 9/11 Ollie Byrd (OB)
I'm falling into the trap - about Michael Moore Kevin Wohlmut (KW)
Slate's Chris Hitchens does a hatchet job on Michael Moore Chris Parry (CP)
Christopher Hitchens' disingenuous attack on Fahrenheit 9/11 Mark Jensen (MJ)
Doublethink: Moore, Hitchens, Orwell and the Soul of the American Left Stephen Himes (SH)

I lifted a couple of passages from a web page once linked to on the Medialens chat forum but it has since expired and I am no longer sure who to credit. Please accept my apologies.

Update: I think it may have been Lenin. In fact I'm pretty sure it was. LT = Lenin's Tomb.
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